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ABSTRACT 
In the article, we review recent literature on fiscal sustainability with particular reference to 
problems that are specific to transition countries. While the original literature on fiscal 
sustainability is chiefly focused on industrial countries there are by now few works that have 
focused on fiscal sustainability in transition countries. Consequently, the article’s purpose is 
to assess the short-, medium- and long-term sustainability of fiscal policy (under set 
assumptions) on the national level in the great majority of transition countries which we 
divide into three main groups, i.e. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Southern and Eastern 
Europe (SEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Based on simple 
mainstream theory measures of fiscal sustainability, the results indicate that fiscal 
sustainability seems to be a problem in many transition countries, particularly in CEE (e.g. 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and the SEE region (e.g. Albania and Croatia).  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fiscal sustainability has drawn increased attention in transition countries, recently. Indeed, 
almost all transition economies have experienced large deficits in both balances since the start 
of the transition process.
1
 On one hand transition economies collapsed, prompting the 
government to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy in the form of increased expenditures (to 
build up social and physical infrastructure) and extended tax incentives to encourage 
investment. Moreover, fiscal deficits expanded as governments tried to absorb the revenue 
and expenditure pressure associated with the sharp falls in GDP and fiscal restructuring. 
Consequently, a substantial increase in the public debt/GDP ratio has emerged in the region. 
Recently, there has been also noticed a shift from Keynesian to more classical oriented 
economic thinking and its conservative stance. Thus, the demands also supported by many 
international organizations (e.g. IMF) and international credit agencies for balanced budget 
balances and even budget surpluses have emerged considerably. Moreover, a stable public 
                                                 
1
 Unstable public finance had undoubtedly a significant role to play in the Czech and the Russian financial crisis 
in 1997 and 1998, respectively (McGettigan, 2000).  
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finance is an explicit criterion for many transition economies’ eligibility for Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU).
2
 
 
The most common way of assessing a given economy’s fiscal position is to analyse fiscal 
sustainability, where the ‘sustainable’ level of the fiscal imbalance was that level consistent 
with solvency, i.e. satisfies the criterion that the total public debt to GDP ratio should not 
increase. While the original literature on fiscal sustainability mostly focused on industrial 
countries (see Blanchard, 1990) there are, by now, a few pieces that, like this one, focus on 
fiscal sustainability in transition countries (for some early attempts, see Buiter, 1996; Budina 
and van Wijnbergen, 1997; Green et al., 2000, etc.). Work that is closely related to ours 
includes Pasinetti (2000) and builds upon some previous similar attempts for transition 
countries (see Fanizza and Mourmouras, 1994) in the following important direction, i.e. 
assessment of short-term, medium-term and long-term general government fiscal 
sustainability for twenty-four transition countries based primarily on 2004 data and/or 2001-
2004 period average data. 
 
The article is organized as follows. The next chapter briefly summarizes trends and 
developments of fiscal positions in transition economies. Chapter 3 introduces the concept of 
fiscal sustainability and discusses its main definitions and the main sustainability indicators 
that have been proposed by the theoretical and empirical literature. The empirical framework 
and results of the estimations of selected indicators under a variety of assumptions are 
presented in Chapter 4. The final section provides concluding remarks and some policy 
implications.     
 
 
2. FISCAL IMBALANCES IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
 
At the beginning of the transformation process fiscal policy had an important role in replacing 
the decline in private consumption which had appeared as a consequence of the collapse of 
output. Government expenditure in most transition economies in 1992 was significantly 
higher than in market economies with comparable levels of per capita GDP (in purchasing 
power parity terms), sometimes more than ten percentage points of GDP higher. 
Consequently, most transition economies implemented major fiscal reforms, some more 
successfully than others. In the early stage of the transition the need for major fiscal reforms 
was generally underestimated. The emphasis was more on the need for rapid privatization and 
‘getting the state out of the economy’; the need to reform state structures and the public 
administration in order to perform their very different but crucial roles in a market economy 
received less attention until a number of fiscal crises emerged (Economic Survey of Europe, 
2000). Nevertheless, more recently practically all transition economies have admitted the need 
for totally new systems requiring not only new tax laws but also new fiscal institutions, new 
skills, technical knowledge, and political capital.       
                                                 
2
 Recently, an important step towards the Euro Area was taken by Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia which joined 
the ERM II with effect from 28 June 2004 and latter by Latvia with effect from 2 May 2005 (ECB, 2005). 
Nevertheless, only Slovenia managed to fulfil all Maastricht criteria (including both fiscal criteria) and joined the 
EMU in 2007. 
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Within the transition process economic reforms have taken place with damaging impacts on 
existing public finances. First, by the destruction of central plans and the elimination of 
information on quantities of goods produced and their prices. Consequently, the government 
had to rely on other sources, including taxpayers’ declarations that increased tax evasion. 
Second, the reforms dramatically increased the number of producers and thus of potential 
taxpayers. In fact, the large state enterprises which once provided the bulk of tax revenue have 
been replaced by new, small and difficult-to tax private producers. Since a tax culture never 
developed in the centrally planned economies, people reacted with hostility to the 
introduction of an explicit tax system. Finally, the economic reforms removed the restrictions 
on payment methods that had existed under central planning when all payments were 
channeled through the central bank. Accordingly, tax arrears and payments in the form of 
barter have grown, creating major difficulties for the new system (Tanzi, 1999).              
 
Table 1: Public balances in selected transition countries, 1992-2003 (in % of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Notes: n.a. – not available. 
 
Sources: EBRD (2006), EIU (2005), IMF (2005), author’s calculations. 
 
 1992–
1997 
(averages) 
1998–
2003 
(averages) 
1992–
2003 
(averages) 
Czech R. 0.5 –3.4 –1.5 
Estonia –0.1 –0.4 –0.2 
Hungary –3.5 –5.4 –4.5 
Latvia –1.0 –2.2 –1.6 
Lithuania –4.1 –3.6 –3.8 
Poland –2.9 –3.4 –3.1 
Slovakia –4.1 –4.0 –4.0 
Slovenia 0.2 –1.4 –0.6 
CEE  –1.8 –3.0 –2.4 
Albania –14.4 –8.9 –11.6 
Bulgaria –1.7 –4.1 –3.3 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina –6.9 –0.4 –3.6 
Croatia –1.6 –5.2 –3.4 
Macedonia  –4.8 –2.4 –3.6 
Romania –3.4 –3.5 –3.5 
Serbia and 
Montenegro n. a. –2.6 –2.6 
SEE –5.9 –3.9 –4.9 
Armenia  –18.1 –4.0 –11.0 
Azerbaijan  –6.0 –1.9 –3.9 
Belarus  –3.2 –1.4 –2.3 
Georgia  –13.1 –3.8 –8.4 
Kyrgyz R. –4.9 –1.6 –3.3 
Moldavia  –9.3 –8.0 –8.7 
Russia  –10.2 –1.1 –5.6 
Tajikistan  –7.4 0.6 –3.4 
Ukraine  –11.8 –1.1 –6.5 
Armenia  –3.1 –0.9 –2.0 
Azerbaijan  –11.2 –0.5 –5.8 
Belarus  –7.6 –1.4 –4.5 
CIS –8.8 –2.1 –5.5 
Total –5.5 –3.0 –4.3 
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The patterns in public revenues and expenditure reflect local factors as well as the mixed 
advice transition economies received from Western economies and institutions such as the 
IMF and the WB. An analysis of the fiscal data of transition economies yields several stylized 
facts. Most importantly, almost all transition economies went through a dramatic fiscal 
adjustment. In fact, the turnaround in fiscal imbalances has been especially remarkable for 
CIS economies which reduced their average deficits from an average of 8.8 percent of GDP in 
the 1992-1997 period to a moderate fiscal deficit of 2.1 percent of GDP in the 1998-2003 
period (see Table 1). The extent of this fiscal adjustment in CIS is more than twice as much as 
that of SEE economies whose average deficit was reduced from 5.9 percent of GDP to 3.9 
percent of GDP in the same period. These fiscal imbalance trends were the outcome of a 
major revenue shock at the start of transition. For many CIS economies, independence from 
the Soviet Union also meant the loss of large fiscal transfers from Moscow which further 
compounded declines in government revenues from the recession and the flawed tax system 
with its weak administration.
3
 Consequently, the CIS’ average budget revenues declined from 
29.3 percent of GDP in 1992 to 24.1 percent of GDP in 2003. 
 
The sudden loss of control over state resources in CIS economies forced governments to 
sharply cut expenditures. In fact, the average expenditure for CIS economies fell from about 
43.8 percent of GDP in 1992 to 25.0 percent of GDP in 2003. In some cases, the expenditure 
cuts were dramatic, as in Tajikistan and Armenia where general government expenditure 
declined from the CIS’ highest levels of 65.7 percent and 46.7 percent of GDP in 1992 to the 
CIS’ lowest levels of 15.6 percent and 18.9 percent of GDP, respectively. Accordingly, as the 
transition process progressed, especially after the Russian (financial) crisis of 1998, the fiscal 
balances of CIS economies improved in large part due to the boom in energy prices which 
positively effect CIS energy exporting economies as well as due to revenue collection 
improvements, expenditure restraints and the more prudent management of external debt 
reflecting the ‘lesson of the Russian crisis’.       
 
Contrary to the CIS and SEE fiscal imbalance trends, CEE economies started with much 
lower average fiscal deficits, averaging out at 1.8 percent of GDP in 1992-1997 and even 
deteriorating to an average 3 percent of GDP in 1998-2003, generally as a result of 
maintaining relatively high government expenditure shares (an average of 38.3 percent of 
GDP in the 1998-2003 period) and a moderate decline of government revenues in the period 
(e.g. in Czech Republic and Poland by more than ten structural points in the 1992-2003 
period) (see Table 1). An important measure to deal with the revenue shortfall was the 
adoption of value-added tax (VAT). The rate initially adopted has generally been reduced, and 
in most CEE states VAT now provides about the same proportion of total fiscal revenue as in 
most Western European states (i.e. 15 to 25 percent). Moreover, a number of CEE and SEE 
economies have introduced, or are in the process of introducing, uniform personal income 
taxes.  
 
As mentioned above, the recent worsening budgetary performance in CEE economies marks a 
departure from the pattern of most CIS and SEE economies. However, in some CEE 
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 For example, in 1992 both Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic lost transfers from Moscow which were 
equivalent to about 18 percent of GDP in 1991 (see Alam and Sundberg, 2002).  
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economies (e.g. Estonia – increasing government revenues, and Lithuania – declining 
government expenditures) a relatively significant improvement in the fiscal balance has been 
seen in recent years. While most CEE economies are clustered in a narrow band there are 
extremes, for example Czech Republic’s overall budget in 2003 posted the highest deficit 
among all transition economies of 6.6 percent of GDP while Estonia posted a surplus of 1.7 
percent of GDP. Nevertheless, when one looks at the change in primary balances CEE 
economies generally maintained the average balance of their primary budget, while CIS 
economies drastically reduced their large deficits in the 1992-2003 period since interest 
expenditure were growing in the same period. However, despite the declining share of 
expenditure in GDP, real public expenditure has been rising in many transition economies due 
to the relatively high GDP growth. Therefore, the fiscal reform process in the region consists 
more of ensuring that the budget process continues to require the necessary instruments for 
increasing efficiency, in the course of which further control over expenditure is likely to 
provide savings. In addition, less government interventions in the market, further reductions 
of budget deficits and structural reform of public finance aiming at improving the quality and 
efficiency of government remain important targets of economic policy in most transition 
economies.  
 
 
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
To decide whether a country may need debt reduction or not requires assessing if a country 
suffers of a solvency problem. The intertemporal solvency criterion does however impose 
some limits on the behavior of non-interest fiscal balance (i.e. the primary fiscal balance). 
Such solvency constraint implies that the discounted value of primary fiscal balances should 
be at least equal to the initial government debt; if a government is initially running primary 
fiscal deficits and has a stock of foreign debt, it needs to run primary fiscal surpluses over 
time to remain solvent. More specifically, as long as the discounted value of government debt 
is non-zero in the infinite limit, the public sector is solvent. This means only that the 
government cannot increase its debt faster than the real interest rate on this debt.  
 
However, the theoretical criteria for government solvency are quite loose. Indeed, IMF (2002) 
and Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) suggest that solvency is only a necessary condition for 
sustainability because solvency could be achieved with very large and costly future 
adjustments. Therefore, a non-increasing government debt to GDP ratio is seen as a practical 
sufficient condition for sustainability, i.e. a government is likely to remain solvent as long as 
the ratio is not growing. So, we can define a policy stance as sustainable if a borrower is 
expected to be able to continue servicing its debt without an unrealistically large future 
correction to the balance of income and expenditure (IMF, 2002, pp. 4). Moreover, this 
criterion is related to so called fiscal primary gap, which is the difference between the actual 
fiscal primary balance and the primary balance required to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio. 
Simple accounting identity helps shed light on the fiscal sustainability issue. According to 
Hemming and Miranda (1991, pp. 70-72) and Roux (1993, pp. 327) the (short-term) budget 
constraint is presented: 
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where Dt, Yt, Bt, Rt stand for total public debt, nominal GDP, nominal primary (negative) 
balance of the public sector (i.e. the gap between non-interest expenditure and total revenue) 
and a residual factor applicable to he public sector, respectively. In addition, rt represents the 
real interest rate applicable to the public sector and gt the real economic growth rate. Note that 
the first part of right-hand area in equation (1) refers to the interest component of government 
expenditure ((rt - gt)/ Dt-1/Yt)). Indeed, when rt > gt this indicated upward pressure on the 
debt/GDP ratio, while rt < gt indicates downward pressure. On the other hand, the remaining 
part of the right-hand area indicates non-interest flows of government. If it is negative, 
government runs a primary surplus, implying downward pressure o the debt/GDP ratio. If it is 
positive, government runs a primary deficit, putting upward pressure on the debt/GDP ratio. 
Depending on the magnitude and signs of the both right-hand parts there will be a net positive 
or negative effect on the debt/GDP ratio.     
 
When assessing fiscal sustainability issue, the main priority is to indicate whether a 
continuation of the present policy stance (as expressed in the present relation between the 
levels of expenditure and revenue) causes the debt/GDP ratio to explode, implode or remain 
stabile. In this relation, Bispham (1987) developed a set of equations that fulfils that need. If 
interest is paid and the primary deficit (b=Bt/Yt) is a constant ratio of GDP, the overall public 
deficit ratio is not constant. Hence, interest payments can cause the overall public deficit to 
change. What happened to the debt/GDP ratio depends on the relationship between the 
interest rate, r, and the economic growth rate, g, which can be presented as (if g > r):    
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When r > g the change in the debt/GDP ratio depends on the size and sign of initial debt/GDP 
ratio and primary balance. If there is initial public debt and primary deficit, the debt/GDP 
ratio explodes as t → ∞ (fiscal policy is unsustainable). On the other hand, if government runs 
a primary surplus and have no initial debt (or have even initial net claims), government has an 
explosive net worth position. Although this situation is unlikely to appear in reality, fiscal 
policy will also bee unsustainable. However, if we want to estimate the (un)sustainability 
position when first and third right-hand term operate in opposite directions, we have to 
determine if: 
 
00 /)
1
( YD
gr
g
b >
−
+
−     (4) 
 
Thus, according to the presented equations, to establish (short-run) sustainability, government 
should run a primary surplus sufficient enough to cover the excess caused by the real interest 
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rate over real growth rate, i.e. sustainable primary surplus (Mourmouras, 1994), which can be 
presented as (Gonzalez-Paramo et al., 1992, pp. 275): 
 
tttttt YDgrYB /)(/ 1−−=−     (5) 
 
Unsustainability is indicated as a position where the real interest rate, rt, exceeds real 
economic growth, gt, and where the primary balance, Bt, is persistently either in deficit, or in 
a surplus not large enough to cover the excess of the real interest rate over the real growth 
rate. Additionally, Buiter (1985) suggests an alternative indicator of sustainability, where it 
depends on the difference between actual primary surplus and the surplus that stabilizes net 
government wealth (as ratio to GDP). However, this indicator is hard to apply since the 
government net worth is very difficult to measure.  
 
On the other hand, in order to measure the medium-term and long-term tax gaps (Blanchard, 
1993) and the sustainable conventional public balance alternative indicators has been 
introduced. For example, sustainable budget deficit (-GOVBt) is derived from equation (5) and 
equals the growth rate multiplied by the debt ratio: 
 
  
tttttttttt YgDYrDYDgrYGOVB ///)(/ 111 −−− −=−−=−   (6) 
 
Moreover, because equation (6) ignores the relationship between the real interest rate and the 
real economic growth rate, the conventional deficit is too crude a measure to use when 
analyzing the sustainability of fiscal policy. Therefore, as alternative the medium-term tax gap 
(t
*
n – t) can be taken, where the real interest rate, real economic growth rate and the projected 
path of no-interest expenditure are taken as given. In this respect, the required tax rate 
necessary to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio is as follows (Blanchard, 1993): 
 
00
* /)(/)(exp YDgrntrft t −++= ∑     (7) 
 
where exp, trf and n state for government expenditure, transfers (both as a ratio to GDP), and 
the numbers of years over which govexp and trf are incurred, respectively. However, equation 
(7) holds if the values of n and (r – g) are not large. The long-run tax gap is similar to the 
medium-term tax gap. But, it is specified for a period of 30-40 years and allows for factors 
that change expenditure (e.g. demographics) (see Wickens, 1992). 
 
Indeed, equations (2) – (7) provide a set of satisfied test indicators to determine potential 
unsustainability of public finance given that the current (primary) public balance is 
maintained and that the interest rate and economic growth rate are on a stabile (medium-run) 
path. Nevertheless, we should have in mind, that fiscal policy is sustainable only is the 
assumptions made about the variables hold. Therefore, the caution must be undertaken when 
setting the assumptions of the model. 
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4. THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1.  Assumptions and Data 
 
First, we estimate public finance sustainability for twenty-four transition economies, i.e. the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (CEE), 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and 
Montenegro (SEE) and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (CIS).
4
 However, in order to calculate 
a sustainable level of their fiscal balance some assumptions must be made. Indeed, this 
exercise is, by nature, quite sensitive to the various assumptions made about what is the 
steady state of the economies under consideration. Arbitrarily, the steady state for transition 
countries is considered to reflect the historical values of the key variables as follows: 
- the equilibrium level of public debt (D/Y) is assumed to be for year 2004 (for short-
term period) or the average of the 2001-2004 period (for medium- and long-term 
period) (EBRD and Eurostat data); alternatively, it is assumed for all sampled 
economies that governments are comfortable tolerating a debt ratio of 60 percent (D/Y
 
*
); 
- the (nominal or real) interest rate (i or r) is the average of effective interest rates on 
public debt in 2004 (short-term) or in 2001-2004 period (IMF data); 
- nominal (gn) and real growth projections (g) are the average over the 2000-2008 
period (EBRD and IMF data) for medium-term and the average over 2000-2040 
period (UN/ECE GDP growth projections) for long-term period. 
 
The empirical results are summarised in the next sub-section. First, the checking of short- , 
medium- and long-term sustainability of public finance is performed by applying 
methodology suggested by Fanizza and Mourmouras (1994). The results for the selected 
transition countries, including the scenario dynamics of public debt to GDP ratio in 5 and 10 
years period, are reported in Table 2 and 3. And secondly, Wickens (1992) and Blanchard 
(1993) methodology is applied to calculate long-term public balance sustainability levels for 
the transition countries. Empirical results are reported in Table 4.   
 
4.2. Empirical results  
 
In this subchapter we apply equations (4) - (6) in order to assess fiscal sustainability in the 
great majority of transition countries. Firstly, we are concentrating on the short-term 
sustainability of twenty-four transition countries. In Table 2, first three columns (1-3) show 
the relevant magnitudes (public debt/GDP ratio, nominal rate of growth, and nominal interest 
rate) for the calculation of sustainable level of primary public balance. Thus, column 4 and 5 
show the computation of equation (2), as applied to each transition country. Each figure 
represents the maximum fiscal deficit each country can sustain. More precisely, it indicates 
the maximum hypothetical ratio between fiscal deficit and GDP that each transition country 
can afford, while keeping a non-increasing public debt/GDP ratio. Columns 7 and 8 show the 
gap between the corresponding calculated (columns 4 and 5) and actual primary fiscal balance 
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 Due to data deficiencies other transition economies were not included in the sample.  
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(column 6). Since each year’s deficit goes to increase the outstanding public debt, the higher 
is the (positive) gap between actual fiscal deficit and hypothetical fiscal deficit, the higher the 
speed at which the public debt decreases.   
 
Table 2 shows the results of fiscal sustainability based on equation (2). In 2004 actual and 
calculated (short-term) sustainable fiscal levels seem to be the same, i.e. fiscal deficits of 0.6 
of GDP, if we consider actual public debt in the CEE countries. On the other hand, if we take 
into considerations targeted public debt (i.e. 60 percent of GDP), the calculated (permitted) 
average fiscal deficit is relatively higher and the gap between actual and calculated deficit 
amounts to 1.2 percentage points.
5
 However, this average covers substantial differences 
between the countries. Thus, the short-term fiscal policy stances of the Czech R., Hungary 
and Poland seem to be unsustainable. On the other hand, by far the most favorable position is 
that of Estonia. Indeed, Estonia is the only country of the CEE region with the budget surplus, 
i.e. 1.7 percent of GDP (in 2004). In the rest of the transition regions (SEE and CIS 
countries), only Croatia seems to have an excessive short-term fiscal deficit. Actually, in 2004 
the gaps between actual and calculated primary fiscal balances are positive and high on an 
average level, indicating sustainable fiscal positions in the both transition regions.    
        
However, the preceding employment of (short-term) fiscal sustainability indicator may give a 
distorter picture of the amount of adjustments that would reasonably be required for different 
reasons. Indeed, the calculated (primary) fiscal balances (as GDP ratio) can be distorted by for 
example speeding up privatization receipts (if the privatized assets would have yielded 
positive future net cash flow to the government) or by cutting back government capital 
formation (if the present discounted value of the future net cash flow to the government 
would be positive). Additionally, Buiter (1985) pointed out two further weaknesses of the 
one-period primary gap indicator. The first emphasizes that actual current primary fiscal 
balance could be affected by cyclical increases or reductions in public sector revenues and/or 
expenditures. And the second, the current nominal interest rate and growth of nominal GDP 
may be unrepresentative of their respective long-term expected average values. Hence, the 
need for the medium- and long-term perspectives emerges, which are adopted in the 
resumption of the paper.     
 
Hence, we gauged medium-term fiscal sustainability of the same twenty-four transition 
countries. Under the set assumptions presented on the previous subsection the primary public 
balance seems not to be medium-term sustainable for the most of the countries in the CEE 
regions (exceptions are Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia). Indeed, their calculated sustainable 
size as a percentage share of GDP is relatively small, fluctuating between 0.2 (Poland) and -
3.0 (Slovakia) if we consider actual public debt. The lowest sustainable current account 
balance, namely in Poland, can chiefly be explained by the fact that this economy has been 
projected to have one of the lowest average growth rates of real GDP (3.6 percent p.a.) and 
one of the highest levels of real effective interest rates among all CEE countries (4.2 percent). 
                                                 
5
 While many of the transition countries under consideration reported public debt stock below tolerating 
benchmark for the EMU (60 percent of GDP), their sustainable public primary deficits could be even higher. In 
particular, this is valid for Baltic States, Slovenia and Romania where public debt to GDP ratio is well below the 
different transition region’s averages. 
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On the contrary, Slovakia is confronted with one of the lowest real effective interest rate (1.7 
percent). However, similar to short-term fiscal sustainability results, Estonia again shows the 
strongest sustainable fiscal position in the CEE region. Contrary to the CEE region, most of 
the remaining transition countries show sustainable medium-term fiscal policy stance. The 
only exceptions are Albania, Croatia and Macedonia (SEE region) and Armenia (CIS region). 
While Croatia and Macedonia have excessive fiscal deficit primarily due to relatively 
moderate real GDP growth averages (4.0 and 3.7 percent, respectively), high real effective 
interest rate is the main reason for unsustainable medium-term fiscal position in Armenia (7.5 
percent) and Albania (4.9 percent). 
 
In addition to the analysis above, a special attention is paid to the evolution in the debt to 
GDP ratio for periods of 5 and 10 years. If we assume, that relatively high real GDP growth 
rate and existent real interest rate (average 2001-04) is maintained, then only CEE region as a 
whole is faced with an increase of an average public debt to GDP ratio. Indeed, the average 
public debt to GDP ratio is planned to increase from 30.7 percent of GDP to 33.9 percent of 
GDP after 5 years and 37.2 percent of GDP after 10 years in CEE region. Actually, only 
Estonia and Slovenia are planning to have lower public debt to GDP ratio after 10 year period 
in the considered region. On the other hand, the average public debt to GDP ratio is planned 
to decline from 47.1 percent of GDP to 44.1 percent of GDP after 5 years (42.2 percent of 
GDP after 10 years) and from 49.3 percent of GDP to 39.3 percent of GDP (31.7 percent of 
GDP) in SEE and CIS region, respectively. There are only few countries where public debt is 
planning to rise under set assumptions, such as Albania, Croatia, Macedonia (SEE region) and 
Armenia and Belarus (CIS region). Nevertheless, in these circumstances the most significant 
lowering of public debt to GDP ratio is noticed in CIS region, in particular in Moldavia, 
Ukraine and Russia.  
 
Finally, we consider briefly the long-term fiscal sustainability in all three transition regions 
under consideration. Table 4, because of its similarity to Table 2 and 3, does not need to be 
illustrated in detail. It refers to equation (6) which helps us to reveal long-term sustainability 
of public finance. The results indicate that practically all CEE countries (except Estonia) and 
majority of SEE countries show unsustainable long-term public finance.
6
 The group of 
countries including Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia (CEE), and Albanian, Macedonia and 
Romania (SEE) face moderate sustainability problems with the (negative) gaps between 
actual and calculated fiscal balance of around 1.0-2.0 percentage points. However, the most 
substantial long-term fiscal problems might affect countries, such as Czech R., Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia (CEE) and Croatia (SEE).
7
 On the other hand, practically all CIS countries 
under consideration (except Belarus) show sustainable long-term fiscal policy stance.         
                                                 
6
 When taking into account targeted public debt assumption (60 percent of GDP) the fiscal situation is slightly 
better in both of the regions since great majority of the countries have public debt below the assumed one.  
7
 Indeed, Convergence Report (2004) set out that regarding the sustainability of fiscal developments, keeping the 
overall and primary balance ratios at current levels would not be sufficient to keep the public debt ratio below 60 
percent of GDP in the medium to long term, which points to a need for further substantial consolidation. With 
the fiscal deficits projected for the coming years, all countries under consideration would not comply with the 
Stability and Growth Pact’s medium-term objective of a fiscal position that is close to balance or in surplus. In 
addition, the revenue and expenditure ratios of the public sector are rather high. In this context, a more efficient 
and employment - friendly tax/benefit system could strengthen work incentives and make a significant 
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Table 2: Short-term fiscal sustainability in 24 transition countries 
 
 
 
Calculated  
(short-term) 
primary public 
balance  
((i-gn)/(1+gn))*(D/Y) 
Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Debt  
(D/Y) 
(2004) 
(1) 
 
 
Growth rate 
of nominal 
GDP 
(gn) 
(2004) 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nominal 
interest 
rate 
(i) 
(2004)  
(3) 
 
 
 
Actual 
public debt 
assumption  
 
 
 
(4) 
Targeted 
public debt 
assumption 
(60 % of 
GDP) 
 
 
(5) 
Actual 
primary 
public 
balance  
(-b) 
( 2004) 
(6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diff. 
(Actual-
Calculated 
(actual 
public debt 
assumption) 
(7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diff. 
(Actual-
Calculated 
(targeted 
public debt 
assumption) 
(8) 
         
CEE 
(average) 31.1 9.5 6.2 -0.6 -1.8 -0.6 0.0 1.2 
Czech R. 24.0 7.4 5.5 -0.4 -1.1 -2.2 -1.8 -1.1 
Estonia 5.5 10.8 5.5 -0.3 -2.9 2.0 2.3 4.9 
Hungary 60.7 8.7 8.3 -0.2 -0.2 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 
Latvia 14.7 14.8 5.4 -1.2 -4.9 -0.2 1.0 4.7 
Lithuania 21.4 8.9 5.8 -0.6 -1.7 -0.1 0.5 1.6 
Poland 50.1 8.8 7.1 -0.8 -0.9 -2.8 -2.0 -1.9 
Slovakia 42.6 9.2 6.4 -1.1 -1.5 -0.8 0.3 0.7 
Slovenia 29.5 7.5 5.5 -0.5 -1.1 0.2 0.7 1.3 
         
SEE 
(average) 42.9 10.6 4.7 -2.2 -3.0 -0.1 2.1 2.9 
Albania 55.6 8.8 7.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 0.4 0.5 
Bulgaria 48.3 6.4 4.0 -1.1 -1.4 1.7 2.8 3.1 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 31.1 5.9 1.3 -1.4 -2.6 -0.7 0.7 1.9 
Croatia 41.5 7.5 5.6 -0.7 -1.1 -4.2 -3.5 -3.1 
Macedonia  37.6 2.6 2.4 -0.1 -0.1 1.6 1.7 1.7 
Romania 26.2 24.1 9.9 -3.0 -6.9 -0.2 2.8 6.7 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 60.2 19.0 2.1 -8.5 -8.5 1.2 9.7 9.7 
         
CIS 
(average)                       39.9 19.4 3.2 -4.7 -8.0 0.2 4.9 8.2 
Armenia  35.6 16.0 0.7 -4.7 -7.9 -1.2 3.5 6.7 
Azerbaijan  18.6 17.0 0.8 -2.6 -8.3 -1.0 1.6 7.3 
Belarus  9.0 32.8 6.4 -1.8 -11.9 0.5 2.3 12.4 
Georgia  54.3 13.3 2.8 -5.0 -5.6 -0.3 4.7 5.3 
Kyrgyz R. 93.7 11.2 1.5 -8.2 -5.3 -3.7 4.5 1.6 
Moldavia  60.6 20.1 2.1 -9.1 -9.0 2.9 12.0 11.9 
Russia  21.7 25.2 5.6 -3.4 -9.4 6.2 9.6 15.6 
Tajikistan  39.4 17.7 5.4 -4.1 -6.3 -2.1 2.0 4.2 
Ukraine  26.0 21.1 3.3 -3.8 -8.8 0.3 4.1 9.1 
Sources: EBRD (2006), EIU (2005), IMF (2005), Eurostat (2006), author’s calculations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
contribution to fiscal consolidation, while promoting economic growth and real income convergence in the 
context of completing the process of transition to a market economy. 
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Table 3: Medium-term fiscal sustainability in 24 transition countries  
 
 
Calculated  
(medium-term) 
primary public 
balance  
((r-g)/(1+g))*(D/Y) 
Country 
 
Public Debt  
(D/Y) 
(2001-04 
averages) 
Growth rate 
of real GDP 
(g) 
(2000-08 
averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real 
effective 
interest 
rate 
(r) 
(2001-04 
averages) 
 
 
 
Actual 
public debt 
assumption  
 
 
 
 
Targeted 
public debt 
assumption 
(60 % of 
GDP) 
 
 
 
Actual 
primary 
public 
balance 
(b) 
( 2001-04 
averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diff. 
(Actual-
Calculated 
(actual 
public debt 
assumption) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
debt 
(D/Y) 
after 
5 
years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
debt 
(D/Y) 
after 
10 
years 
 
CEE 
(average) 30.7 4.8 2.3 -0.8 -1.7 -1.2 -0.4 33.9 37.2 
Czech R. 32.4 3.5 1.7 -0.6 -1.1 -2.9 -2.3 43.7 54.0 
Estonia 5.5 6.4 1.5 -0.2 -2.6 1.8 2.0 -3.9 -11.3 
Hungary 55.6 3.8 1.2 -1.4 -1.5 -2.6 -1.2 61.3 66.4 
Latvia 14.6 6.7 3.3 -0.5 -1.9 -0.8 -0.3 16.2 17.5 
Lithuania 21.6 6.6 5.1 -0.3 -0.9 -0.4 -0.1 22.1 22.5 
Poland 41.7 3.6 4.2 0.2 0.4 -2.4 -2.6 55.1 68.8 
Slovakia 44.6 4.2 1.7 -3.0 -4.0 -2.8 0.2 52.8 60.1 
Slovenia 29.4 3.2 -0.3 -0.9 -1.8 0.2 1.1 24.2 19.7 
 
SEE 
(average) 47.1 4.7 -2.7 -3.4 -4.7 -0.8 2.5 44.1 42.2 
Albania  66.0 6.0 4.9 -0.7 -0.6 -2.2 -1.5 73.4 80.5 
Bulgaria  62.9 4.3 -0.4 -2.8 -2.7 2.5 5.3 39.4 20.4 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 46.0 5.1 -1.4 -2.9 -3.7 -1.9 1.0 44.5 43.3 
Croatia  41.8 4.0 2.6 -2.9 -4.1 -3.1 -0.2 54.1 65.7 
Macedonia 32.5 3.7 1.2 -0.8 -1.4 -1.3 -0.5 35.0 37.1 
Romania  27.6 4.6 -14.6 -5.1 -11.0 -0.4 4.7 23.9 20.9 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 53.1 5.3 -11.5 -8.5 -9.6 0.5 9.0 38.6 27.4 
 
CIS 
(average)                       49.3 6.7 -4.2 -3.0 -5.2 -0.1 2.9 39.3 31.7 
Armenia 39.5 7.0 7.5 0.2 0.3 -0.4 -0.6 42.5 45.5 
Azerbaijan  24.8 8.4 1.1 -1.7 -4.0 -0.4 1.3 19.2 15.3 
Belarus 10.9 6.9 -37.2 -4.5 -24.8 -1.0 3.5 12.2 13.1 
Georgia 56.8 5.2 2.5 -1.4 -1.5 -0.4 1.0 51.8 47.4 
Kyrgyz R. 106.3 5.9 -2.3 -8.2 -4.6 -4.4 3.8 99.5 94.4 
Moldavia 64.1 6.5 1.4 -3.1 -2.9 2.0 5.1 41.1 23.0 
Russia  46.1 5.7 -10.4 -0.6 -0.8 4.3 4.9 15.6 -7.5 
Tajikistan  57.1 8.1 -2.9 -5.8 -6.1 -1.8 4.0 46.4 39.2 
Ukraine  37.9 6.9 2.2 -1.7 -2.6 1.1 2.8 25.2 15.1 
Source: EBRD (2006), EIU (2005), IMF (2005), Eurostat (2006), author’s calculations. 
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Table 4: Long- term fiscal sustainability in 24 transition countries  
 
Calculated  
(long-term) 
public balance 
((g*(D/Y))  
 
 
 
 
Diff. 
(Actual-Calculated) 
 
 
Country 
 
Public debt  
(D/Y) 
(2001-04) 
averages) 
 Growth 
rate of 
real GDP  
(g) 
(2000-40 
project.) 
 
Actual public 
debt 
assumption 
Targeted public 
debt assumption 
(60 % of GDP) 
Actual 
public 
balance  
(2001-04 
averages) 
 
 
 
Actual public 
debt 
assumption 
 
Targeted 
public debt 
assumption 
(60 % of 
GDP) 
 
CEE 30.7 3.1 -0.9 -1.7 -3.2 -2.3 -1.6 
Czech R. 32.4 2.4 -0.8 0.0 -6.9 -6.1 -6.9 
Estonia 5.5 3.0 -0.2 -1.8 1.7 1.8 3.5 
Hungary 55.6 2.6 -1.4 -1.6 -6.0 -4.5 -4.4 
Latvia 14.6 3.6 -0.5 -2.2 -1.7 -1.1 0.5 
Lithuania 21.6 4.0 -0.9 -2.4 -2.0 -1.2 0.4 
Poland 41.7 3.7 -1.5 -2.2 -3.9 -2.4 -1.7 
Slovakia 44.6 3.2 -1.4 -1.9 -4.7 -3.2 -2.8 
Slovenia 29.4 2.1 -0.6 -1.3 -2.3 -1.7 -1.0 
 
SEE 47.1 5.1 -2.5 -3.1 -3.1 -0.7 -0.1 
Albania 66.0 6.9 -4.6 -4.1 -6.3 -1.7 -2.1 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 46.0 6.2 -2.9 -3.7 -2.6 0.3 1.2 
Bulgaria 62.9 4.0 -2.5 -2.4 0.0 2.5 2.4 
Croatia 41.8 3.9 -1.6 -2.3 -5.7 -4.1 -3.4 
Macedonia 32.5 5.5 -1.8 -3.3 -2.8 -1.0 0.5 
Romania 27.6 3.9 -1.1 -2.3 -2.2 -1.1 0.1 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 53.1 5.3 -2.8 -3.2 -2.4 0.4 0.8 
 
CIS 46.7 7.0 -3.2 -4.2 -1.1 2.1 3.1 
Armenia 39.5 10.0 -4.0 -6.0 -1.8 2.2 4.2 
Azerbaijan 24.8 11.0 -2.7 -6.6 -0.3 2.4 6.3 
Belarus 10.9 3.8 -0.4 -2.3 -1.3 -0.9 1.0 
Georgia 60.9 6.2 -3.8 -3.7 -2.6 1.2 1.1 
Kazakhstan 19.8 8.8 -1.7 -5.3 2.4 4.2 7.7 
Kyrgyz R. 106.3 6.0 -6.4 -3.6 -5.2 1.2 -1.6 
Moldavia 64.1 7.0 -4.5 -4.2 -0.3 4.2 4.0 
Russia 46.1 3.7 -1.7 -2.2 2.4 4.1 4.6 
Tajikistan 57.1 8.0 -4.6 -4.8 -2.6 2.0 2.3 
Ukraine 37.9 5.3 -2.0 -3.2 -1.5 0.5 1.7 
Source: EBRD (2006), EIU (2005), IMF (2005), Eurostat (2006), author’s calculations. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The sustainability of public finance has been an important issue for transition countries in the 
last fifteen years. Policy-makers in transition countries have been facing a combination of 
historical expenditure commitments, uncertainty about new revenue sources coupled with 
uncertainty about the general macroeconomic situation in the country. Indeed, the state of 
public finance usually acts as a litmus test of the progress achieved and the degree of internal 
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consistency and soundness of transformation policy. In these circumstances, if fiscal policy is 
inconsistent there is a substantial and continuing risk that public deficits can leap out of 
control and eventually become unsustainable. Unsustainable government debt paths can 
eventually lead to sharp adjustments, if not to a crisis. Hence, fiscal sustainability is a highly 
desirable quality which should be measured on a regular basis in order to avoid unfavorable 
macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, fiscal policy sustainability has also become a recurrent 
theme for many transition countries, especially for new EU member states in the run-up to 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since the Maastricht Treaty makes fiscal sustainability 
an explicit criterion for a country’s eligibility for EMU.  
 
By using mainstream (primary fiscal gap) theory (proposed by Buiter (1983) and Blanchard 
(1990)), the analysis ensures some degree of restrictiveness. Indeed, given the looseness of 
the theoretical criteria for solvency, a non-increasing public debt to GDP ratio is seen as a 
practical sufficient condition for the sustainability of fiscal policy; a country is likely to 
remain solvent as long as this ratio is not growing. In this respect the primary fiscal gap, 
defined as the difference between the required primary fiscal balance to GDP ratio and the 
actual primary fiscal balance to GDP ratio, is calculated for selected transition countries. 
Based on simple mainstream theory measures of fiscal sustainability, the results indicate that 
fiscal sustainability seems to be a problem in many transition countries, particularly in CEE 
(e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and the SEE region (e.g. Albania and Croatia). In 
this respect, it is vital for these economies (especially for the CEE) to consolidate their fiscal 
(balance and debt) positions in order to be able to join the EMU as soon as possible.  
 
Because of the simplicity and restrictiveness of the presented indicators, at least three main 
caveats should be set up at the end. First, all the indicators used in the analysis are sufficient 
(but not necessary) conditions for long-run sustainability. Indeed, for an economy it may be 
sub-optimal to prevent a country from smoothing expenditure because this would lead to 
overshooting a fiscal ratio that corresponds to a long-run equilibrium. Secondly, most of the 
indicators require assumptions about macroeconomic variables (e.g. GDP growth, interest 
rates etc.) which are implicitly assumed to be exogenous. However, most of the included 
variables tend to be endogenous and/or correlated with each other. Indeed, it is unrealistically 
to assume that changes in economic growth do not affect the primary surplus or vice verse. 
Finally, great majority of factors (such as demographics) that characterize the situation in 
transition economies are not included in these indicators. 
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